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Boeing says it has completed 737 MAX software fix
(CNN) Boeing says it has finished the development of a software fix to its troubled 737 Max, in a statement released Thursday. The plane maker says it has flown the aircraft with the updated software on 207 flights for more than 360 hours. This is the next step in what Boeing hopes will result in the Federal Aviation Administration allowing the plane to resume commercial service. (www.cnn.com) Más...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
Frank, you pretty much have the problem well defined. I would add that pilots were not made aware of the MCAS until problems were reported, and then were not told of software updates to the MCAS that evidently made the problem worse. Without knowing the MCAS was there, and later that the "fix" did not resolve anything, I think at some point there needs to be a way for pilots to disable the MCAS entirely in order to better regain and/or maintain proper control of the aircraft in the event of future problems with the system.
It should be noted that the MCAS is intended to operate autonomously to pilot input when the aircraft is NOT on autopilot, such as during initial departure and on final. This I find odd, should not the pilot have full command of the aircraft when not using autopilot? And why is there no option to the pilot to disable the system, particularly when it is malfunctioning?
Also, with this aircraft being significantly different in design and flight characteristics, why is Boeing claiming no training required, and carriers assuming Boeing is right? I can only assume this was a selling point, since no training translates to carrier savings, at the expense of aircrews and passengers.
It should be noted that the MCAS is intended to operate autonomously to pilot input when the aircraft is NOT on autopilot, such as during initial departure and on final. This I find odd, should not the pilot have full command of the aircraft when not using autopilot? And why is there no option to the pilot to disable the system, particularly when it is malfunctioning?
Also, with this aircraft being significantly different in design and flight characteristics, why is Boeing claiming no training required, and carriers assuming Boeing is right? I can only assume this was a selling point, since no training translates to carrier savings, at the expense of aircrews and passengers.
The 737 MAX is a stable and safe aircraft in its original design. Unfortunately in a few flight envelopes it did not perform exactly like other 737's, so Boeing designed MCAS, so that it would. Without MCAS, the MAX would require separate certifiction for pilots to fly it, which would have added significant training costs. Right now a pilot is certified to fly a 737, regardless of which series it is (300 to 900). From Boeings standpoint, the MAX could NOT have different flying characteristics, otherwise it may as well not be called a 737. The problem isn't the plane, its MCAS.
You sort of hit the nail on the head with part of your statement "Without MCAS, the MAX would require separate certifiction for pilots to fly it, which would have added significant training costs" Not Just training costs but other costs as well, and Boeing was eager to stay ahead of Airbus's A300 NEO family.
The funny thing is...the MAX really isn't that stable on takeoff...it wants to nose up more than appreciated. THAT is the main reason the flawed MCAS system was initialized..and yes I said flawed as in it should have relied on readings from 2 or more sensors AT the beginning!
The funny thing is...the MAX really isn't that stable on takeoff...it wants to nose up more than appreciated. THAT is the main reason the flawed MCAS system was initialized..and yes I said flawed as in it should have relied on readings from 2 or more sensors AT the beginning!
And yet A320 NEO flies without MCAS and meets the customers efficiency needs. If Boeing had spent a lot more money on the plane design to fix the thrust vectoring problems of the oversize engines mounted in a poorly researched position, special certification wouldn't have been needed nor MCAS.
Now it's costing way more cash than a physical design fix.
Now it's costing way more cash than a physical design fix.
They were selling and building aircraft ... ONLY
Boeing were aware there was a defect in their MCAS software, fed only from the port AOA sensor, in November 2017. Lion Air crashed in October 2018. The port AOA sensor appeared involved with the Lion Air crash.
In November 2018 Boeing promised updated MCAS software within a few weeks.
In March 2019 Ehiopian Airlines crashed. Documentation submitted by Boeing to the FAA and others stated that the maximum trim deflection of the horizontal stabilizer was 0.6 degrees. The deflection on the crashed Ethiopian stabilizer was 2.4 degrees. Boeing admitted that they had changed the MCAS program without informing any external entities.
The Max was grounded by everyone, including Canada, except the FAA and Costa Rica. The FAA then decided to ground the Max.
In May 2019, eighteen months after Boeing were aware there was a defect in their MCAS software, and six months after American and Southwest US based pilots were complaining about it, Boeing finally thinks it might have resolved this defect.
If my understanding is incorrect, can someone please tell me what I have misunderstood.
If my understanding is substantially correct what was Boeing doing between November 2017 and March 2019 when they were forced to address the issue ? And how much other software has Boeing had specifically created and tested for the Max and are Boeing aware of any "defects" in this other software ?