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Software Patches - Perfume for a Pig?
I am curious to hear what members think of this article. I have written commercial firmware and software for non-aviation controller applications and I know that a LOT can be done to make the user think the performance has been enhanced by a patch. Sometimes a patch fixes a "bug" (in this case a bug is piece of erroneous code) and that is a good thing. But sometimes a patch compensates for a hardware design flaw. This article makes me think that Boeing is up to the latter. Comments? (www.zdnet.com) Más...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
They all had two AOA sensors but only one was wired in to the MCAS! Which is puzzling becuse usually two systems are wired in order to preserve fail safe redundancy. I find it difficult to believe Boeing could not fathom a bird strike scenario to a sensor and the resultant MCAS activation. But let’s assume both sensors were wired in and both damaged activating the MCAS, Boeings answer was to turn of the Trim Cutout Switches and manually trim to fly the aircraft. Did Boeing forget to brief this in a variant conversion course.....maybe? Was there a reference to it in the Operating Manual....yes. Did the crews say, hey what’s this bloody MCAS reference....apparently not. Had any of the crews ever turned off these switches and flew the aircarft with manual trim only......never. Did Lion Air spec out these aircraft or did they come from a leasing company? Legacy airlines in Canada/USA ordered the aircraft equipped properly and have experienced zero incidents.
I agree, what happened to double and triple redundancy as well as the training Boeing had initially said they would provide, yet didn't.
The fact that it's possible to have warning devices for flight critical systems as an option breaks every regulation in the book at the FAA.
As a software designer myself, I agree that this patch appears to be an attempt to paper over a design flaw. What's particularly galling is that MCAS only takes input from one AOA sensor. So much for redundancy. I would never consider flying my Cessna 172 on only one magneto; why should the designers of the 737 MAX give up redundancy when the consequences are - as we have been graphically shown - so severe?
Why would anyone listen to a moron who calls the FDR a "black box" This reporter/moron does it 4 times
ZDNET readers - See what airline enthusiasts are saying about your article "Boeing 737 Max: Software patches can only do so much" Time to engage flyers with system design engineers"