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My Letter to the Editor of New York Times Magazine - by Capt. “Sully” Sullenberger
The MCAS design should never have been approved, not by Boeing, and not by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (www.sullysullenberger.com) Más...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
Fact: humans were in command of the aircraft. Fact: humans were trained to follow emergency procedures in emergencies. Fact: those emergency procedures, for those specific aircraft, were inherently wrong by design as well as by certification. Captain Sullenberger is right.
For those of us who are not professional pilots, allow me offer a hypothetical consideration. Consider a nice new car from (some fictitious manufacturer, to keep this politically neutral.) As you read the car's manual, you find that, should you need an emergency brake, pull the emergency brake handle up briskly to lock it in the on position. (Yes, I know this isn't exactly like the Boeing issues.) Now suppose the design mistake is that the emergency brake is connected to the accelerator. The Car Safety Administration oversight and certification officials agree that the design is acceptable.
Now, you are in your car, gliding down hill, and a train suddenly crosses the road in front of you and your car. The normal brake pedal breaks and is now useless. You quickly recall how to apply the emergency brake. You pull the handle up, briskly, which locks as advertised. But your car begins to accelerate horribly, quite to your surprise. Here comes the side of that train! What are you going to do?
Ah, things are getting a bit closer to the point of my post. Turning off the engine ignition stops the acceleration. That's not in the car's manual but it's a good idea, eh? But you are still heading, quite speedily, towards the side of that train. You throw the emergency procedures out of your mind and think... think... and think that it's better to hit the side of a building you are near than to hit that train. Boom, you crash but the car's airbags save your life.
Sullenberger's "building" was the Hudson River. The two PICs in those foreign Boeings didn't manage to get to any emergency procedures for bad emergency procedures.
In my hypothetical scenario, the car's manufacturer was clearly to blame. The Car Safety Administration was also (in my opinion, more so) to blame. The drivers of the cars that hit the train could have, but didn't think of, hitting a building. They would be to blame, also, but it would certainly be understandable, eh?
For those of us who are not professional pilots, allow me offer a hypothetical consideration. Consider a nice new car from (some fictitious manufacturer, to keep this politically neutral.) As you read the car's manual, you find that, should you need an emergency brake, pull the emergency brake handle up briskly to lock it in the on position. (Yes, I know this isn't exactly like the Boeing issues.) Now suppose the design mistake is that the emergency brake is connected to the accelerator. The Car Safety Administration oversight and certification officials agree that the design is acceptable.
Now, you are in your car, gliding down hill, and a train suddenly crosses the road in front of you and your car. The normal brake pedal breaks and is now useless. You quickly recall how to apply the emergency brake. You pull the handle up, briskly, which locks as advertised. But your car begins to accelerate horribly, quite to your surprise. Here comes the side of that train! What are you going to do?
Ah, things are getting a bit closer to the point of my post. Turning off the engine ignition stops the acceleration. That's not in the car's manual but it's a good idea, eh? But you are still heading, quite speedily, towards the side of that train. You throw the emergency procedures out of your mind and think... think... and think that it's better to hit the side of a building you are near than to hit that train. Boom, you crash but the car's airbags save your life.
Sullenberger's "building" was the Hudson River. The two PICs in those foreign Boeings didn't manage to get to any emergency procedures for bad emergency procedures.
In my hypothetical scenario, the car's manufacturer was clearly to blame. The Car Safety Administration was also (in my opinion, more so) to blame. The drivers of the cars that hit the train could have, but didn't think of, hitting a building. They would be to blame, also, but it would certainly be understandable, eh?
Not one to minimize Sully's accomplishments, but if MCAS were fatally flawed more planes would have crashed or at least experienced the problems downing the Lion Air and Ethiopian flights. Instead, tens of thousands of MAX flights went off without a hitch. The reported problem with the MCAS in the US on one flight led to a terse complaint filed online, obviously a situation where the pilots figured out what was going on and addressed it.
What makes the Langewiesche article so impressive is that it builds upon a simple notion: crashes are not usually caused by a single factor unless it is obvious pilot error or running out of fuel. Crashes are usually the result of a combination of factors that were unforeseen. Langewiesche identifies a lack of airmanship, a lack of a culture of safety at the airlines involved (pilot training as well as maintenance), potentially shoddy maintenance, unclear or lacking redundancy in the Angle of Attack indicators, inadequate documentation and training by Boeing on MCAS, an FAA clearance proces that didn't catch the problem, and Boeing's unwillingness to fault the airlines to who it was selling planes for fear of losing business _in addition to_ the "do it on the cheap" 737 MAX redesign. It is simplistic to state Langewiesche's article faults only the pilots.
But if we want to look at this tired old "canard" of pilot error, let's look at Airbus. Airbus and the BEA blamed the pilots for the crash of Air France 447. This is in spite of the aircraft's computers presenting the pilots contradictory information leading them into a stall that last more than four minutes as the plane tail-dived into the ocean. The grand irony here is that this is probably the exact scenario Boeing's MCAS was designed to prevent. Under similar circumstances, the Boeing 737 MAX and Airbus 330 when deprived of accurate information from their sensors and having computers unable to reconcile conflicting information to save the flights.
Driving the point home, the Lion Air plane involved in the crash suffered the exact same problem the day before it crashed. The difference was a pilot who happened to be in the cockpit who knew what to do. Not every broken plane crashes. Not every perfectly-function plane flies safely. It is an over-reach to call on MCAS to be scrapped.
https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2019/03/jump-seat-pilot-and-boeing-737-max/585301/
What makes the Langewiesche article so impressive is that it builds upon a simple notion: crashes are not usually caused by a single factor unless it is obvious pilot error or running out of fuel. Crashes are usually the result of a combination of factors that were unforeseen. Langewiesche identifies a lack of airmanship, a lack of a culture of safety at the airlines involved (pilot training as well as maintenance), potentially shoddy maintenance, unclear or lacking redundancy in the Angle of Attack indicators, inadequate documentation and training by Boeing on MCAS, an FAA clearance proces that didn't catch the problem, and Boeing's unwillingness to fault the airlines to who it was selling planes for fear of losing business _in addition to_ the "do it on the cheap" 737 MAX redesign. It is simplistic to state Langewiesche's article faults only the pilots.
But if we want to look at this tired old "canard" of pilot error, let's look at Airbus. Airbus and the BEA blamed the pilots for the crash of Air France 447. This is in spite of the aircraft's computers presenting the pilots contradictory information leading them into a stall that last more than four minutes as the plane tail-dived into the ocean. The grand irony here is that this is probably the exact scenario Boeing's MCAS was designed to prevent. Under similar circumstances, the Boeing 737 MAX and Airbus 330 when deprived of accurate information from their sensors and having computers unable to reconcile conflicting information to save the flights.
Driving the point home, the Lion Air plane involved in the crash suffered the exact same problem the day before it crashed. The difference was a pilot who happened to be in the cockpit who knew what to do. Not every broken plane crashes. Not every perfectly-function plane flies safely. It is an over-reach to call on MCAS to be scrapped.
https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2019/03/jump-seat-pilot-and-boeing-737-max/585301/
Thanks to guys like Sully, we as the flying public can confidently put our lives and the lives of family and friends into the seats of commercial airliners. The team at Boeing seem to be very well suited at selling the entire world a batch of "snake Oil". I'm sure that the litigation will take years to conclude with Boeing going bankrupt to avoid the liability.
Did FlightAware publish Langeweische’s article as well?
From the back of the plane - interesting thread. My takeaway is look at the Max records in the US. BETTER, WELL TRAINED pilots (at least for now, the kids learning to fly for the regionals scare me) no problems. Planes with full safety features. I worked many years for a company who devised an idiot proof system then pushed out the higher priced experienced people and hired idiots. Company almost bought the farm.
One note on Airbus vs Boeing, AB is government supported which gives them an unfair competitive advantage in the marketplace. In fact, Boeing may be the last public company building planes and yes, they have to answer to shareholders, sorry everyone wants to make money like you do too. But yes, as with the home building industry, self-inspections eventually run afoul because of economic pressure. FAA must be more involved. (And I HATE government)
One note on Airbus vs Boeing, AB is government supported which gives them an unfair competitive advantage in the marketplace. In fact, Boeing may be the last public company building planes and yes, they have to answer to shareholders, sorry everyone wants to make money like you do too. But yes, as with the home building industry, self-inspections eventually run afoul because of economic pressure. FAA must be more involved. (And I HATE government)
summer job as a 'male steward, with a quarter of the time being called, stewardess. Evemtually we were all, in a sense, gender neutral and given the name of Flight Attendant. Though it took a good years for it to fully kick in.
Sir, I lived my entire flying career out of NYC [1974-1994 That also makes me #68 in the US hired as a flight attendant] That said, 'That morning, between and radio and hearing what was going on with your aircraft. Being dressed, I grabbed my knapsack, grabbed my bike from the ceiling and headed over to 11th avenue and headed north. it happened that my timing was perfect. As you were starting your decent toward the Hudson. And, We as pretty much know what the are in a ditching. The tail section almost always breaks away.
But with the experience of this PPO;T, THE CALM OF THE DAT, AND YOU CAN THE MILIONS/TENS OF MILLIONS...INCLUDING MINE, HELPED SULLY DOWN. GOD BLESS THIS MAN!