Todos
← Back to Squawk list
FAA no longer letting foreign airlines land alongside another plane at San Francisco airport
U.S. aviation officials are no longer allowing foreign airlines to land alongside another plane when touching down at San Francisco International Airport in the wake of the deadly Asiana Airlines crash. (www.washingtonpost.com) Más...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
I call it "Kamakazism"
I believe the NTSB is holding hearings this week. This means we should see a preliminary report soon after. I will be very surprised if the report fault nothing more then pilot error and the culture of the foreign cockpit. I've also read that because of the Asian culture for authority the board will cite deficiency's in training and management with in the flight deck.
This was cited as a primary cause in a crash of a B747 cargo jet belonging to Korean Airlines. The copilot allowed the Captain to crash the plane rather than challenge his authority is basically what the safety board said. The problem was a pilots artificial horizon. The copilots was working correctly and he could have saved the plane.
The copilot, a more experienced airman and an instructor on this type, should have taken control when he noticed they were low and slow, he didn't . He failed as an instructor and he failed his passengers and crew by not doing so.
This was cited as a primary cause in a crash of a B747 cargo jet belonging to Korean Airlines. The copilot allowed the Captain to crash the plane rather than challenge his authority is basically what the safety board said. The problem was a pilots artificial horizon. The copilots was working correctly and he could have saved the plane.
The copilot, a more experienced airman and an instructor on this type, should have taken control when he noticed they were low and slow, he didn't . He failed as an instructor and he failed his passengers and crew by not doing so.
You are probably correct and we will hear nothing but lack of training. You won't hear an out and out naming of that culture or authority thing. We will just have to read between the lines. For those of us that have had an exposure to it, it would be hard to believe anything else. You are very correct that even though he may have been junior in social status, he did not exercise his 4 bars of authority in that cockpit. I first got exposed to it about 1971, as KAL was getting their first 747s and was talking to one of the Boeing training Captains. He said it was a nightmare, even compared to our ways back that far.
As long as there's politically correct dancing around the truth, there WILL be more deaths as a result of their stupidity.
If Asiana Air, Korean Air and similar airlines do not change their structure based on experience and skill in type, the FAA and US should outright ban their entry into US airspace. But odds are, all the PC fools in Congress and most certainly this administration would defeat such an effort.
If Asiana Air, Korean Air and similar airlines do not change their structure based on experience and skill in type, the FAA and US should outright ban their entry into US airspace. But odds are, all the PC fools in Congress and most certainly this administration would defeat such an effort.
You are probably correct. To read some of the ExPat guys stuff that were over there recently, it isn't any better than it used to be. KAL may have the upper hand just by virtue of being around longer but in their early days, they were just as bad. Hell, in 1971, their newly appointed 747 Captains couldn't hardly get thru the Aircraft door because their heads were swelled so big, according to one of the Boeing training Captains that was there at the time.
Any of the wxpat accounts even recently, reminisce about how things were when they were 'over there' working as contractors to 'fix' te situation.
He supposition is that things are still as bad as ever because of the resistance they felt at trying to instill order 'back then'.
It's still an open question about how much of that cultural influence is still interfering with modern cockpit CRM. It is possible that traditional cultural norms having interfered with good cockpit communication/ action. If so we'll hear about it. But the failure of individuals to act as expected will be attributed to their individual failures, and not to whatever cultural unsrrstnadijgs Ma have interfered with them doing their job as expected.
If we don't hear about fatigue being a significant contributory cause, then it's all exactly as preacher is saying, but the reports won't say it in so many words. They'll dance around the cultural contributory cause. But as long as they show that the pilot's failure to perform at the level expected of any 777 pilot, whether failing to apply the correct flight mode or failing to speak up or to take the plane and correct the too low and too slow approach, they'll be telling us exactly what kind of incompetence led to the crash.
That it was very 'experienced' pilots that let the bird fall out of the sky is shocking. If their experienced pilots can flub so badly, how bad are their pilots with little experience?
He supposition is that things are still as bad as ever because of the resistance they felt at trying to instill order 'back then'.
It's still an open question about how much of that cultural influence is still interfering with modern cockpit CRM. It is possible that traditional cultural norms having interfered with good cockpit communication/ action. If so we'll hear about it. But the failure of individuals to act as expected will be attributed to their individual failures, and not to whatever cultural unsrrstnadijgs Ma have interfered with them doing their job as expected.
If we don't hear about fatigue being a significant contributory cause, then it's all exactly as preacher is saying, but the reports won't say it in so many words. They'll dance around the cultural contributory cause. But as long as they show that the pilot's failure to perform at the level expected of any 777 pilot, whether failing to apply the correct flight mode or failing to speak up or to take the plane and correct the too low and too slow approach, they'll be telling us exactly what kind of incompetence led to the crash.
That it was very 'experienced' pilots that let the bird fall out of the sky is shocking. If their experienced pilots can flub so badly, how bad are their pilots with little experience?
In a nutshell, it was 2 things. They were used to using auto throttles or they wouldn't have set them in the first place. For whatever reason, the mistake was made in not re-arming them for that set. As I said, that was the mistake and a simple one. The reason that somebody did not notice the speed/attitude drop AND say/do something about it is where the problem lies, whether culture or whatever. As I said somewhere in one of these threads, I was PF on our 767 the other day on a DFW hop and return. On the way back, we were on top and I had the AP and AT's engaged. When I turned off the AP, the AT's went to the ACTIVE mode but weren't armed. I hand flew the rest of the way down so I never went back to them but if he did not rearm them, they were basically off line in a standby type mode. Same setup that is on a 777
That was a concise and perfectly written description of both aspects of the pilot failure.
1. The first was the PF's mistake is setting the auto throttles. (belieiving that A/Ts would control airspeed, but not setting them to do so)
2. The PNF's failure to monitor airspeed and altitude or failing to take any corrective action if he did properly monitor.
I just reread the account in Wikipedia. It suggests the the FO in the jump seat calked out sink rate repeatedly during the last minute of flight. (I didn't check their source.) If true, that would be even more damning of the performance of the pilots at the controls.
There was even the complication that the plane deviated from the centerline, after dropping below the glidepath. So the distraction with lateral position took away the pilot's attention at the exact wrong moment, when altitude and airspeed were crucial. This likely results from poor stick skills from PF being on the A320 type for the immediately prior years.
1. The first was the PF's mistake is setting the auto throttles. (belieiving that A/Ts would control airspeed, but not setting them to do so)
2. The PNF's failure to monitor airspeed and altitude or failing to take any corrective action if he did properly monitor.
I just reread the account in Wikipedia. It suggests the the FO in the jump seat calked out sink rate repeatedly during the last minute of flight. (I didn't check their source.) If true, that would be even more damning of the performance of the pilots at the controls.
There was even the complication that the plane deviated from the centerline, after dropping below the glidepath. So the distraction with lateral position took away the pilot's attention at the exact wrong moment, when altitude and airspeed were crucial. This likely results from poor stick skills from PF being on the A320 type for the immediately prior years.
I'll just take your word on the Wiki account, but in reality, the pilot in the jump seat really had no official capacity. If they changed as they should have, he was just sitting in the jump seat as the other guy was in 1st class. The PNF, in this case the instructor, should have been monitoring and calling all that. Left and right seat are the one's on duty to land the plane. As Ken says below, SOMETHING REALLY STUPID
As I've repeatedly told flight students.... the majority of accidents happen because the pilot did something really stupid.
This is just another example.
This is just another example.
Very much so