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Qantas jet drama reinforces seatbelt warnings
How many times before they listen? (www.theaustralian.com.au) Más...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
At the time of the AF447 there was talk of "similar incidents" at Qantas the year before. Is this the episode to which they were referring? I assumed it was unrelated because after the first few weeks nothing more was reported while AF447 was still in the news.
Well, it's 3 years old. Airbus corrected the problem long before this report, and only 3 times in 28 million hours. Pilots did as they were supposed to and flew the plane, recovering from the upset. what is puzzling and in my mind, bear more investigation. All 3 happened to Qantas aircraft and off the West Coast of Austraila. That's puzzling and seems a little more than coincidence. AB is not the oly company that use NG ADIRU's.Had the pax done what we are all told when we fly, keep the belts on, there probably would not have been as many injuries.
Australian Bermuda Triangle?
Was the plane in a thunderstorm?
It didn't say it was.I like Victor's question above: Australian Bermuda Triangle?lol
The final report stated that the weather was fine and clear. If you'd like to read the official report: http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/3532398/ao2008070.pdf
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There was a limitation in the algorithm used by the A330/A340 flight control primary computers for processing angle of attack (AOA) data. This limitation meant that, in a very specific situation, multiple AOA spikes from only one of the three air data inertial reference units could result in a nose-down elevator command.
Procedural changes issued by Airbus
On 15 October 2008, the aircraft manufacturer issued Operations Engineering Bulletin (OEB) OEB-A330-74-1, which was applicable to all A330 aircraft fitted with Northrop Grumman ADIRUs.201 The OEB stated that, in the event of a NAV IR [1, 2 or 3] FAULT (or an ATT red flag being displayed on either the captain’s or first officer’s primary flight display), the flight crew were required to select the air data reference (ADR) part of the relevant ADIRU OFF and then select the relevant inertial reference (IR) part of the relevant ADIRU OFF. The problem was described as a ‘significant operational issue’ and operators were advised to inform their pilots of the OEB without delay and insert the procedure in the Flight Crew Operations Manual. A compatible temporary revision was issued to the Minimum Master Equipment List at the same time.
The ATSN report is AO-2008-070 and can be found at http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2008/aair/ao-2008-070.aspx