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Nine reasons Lion Air 737 Max crashed Final report
On Friday, air crash investigators in Indonesia released their final report, detailing the list of events that caused the Lion Air jet to plunge into the Java Sea. "From what we know, there are nine things that contributed to this accident," Indonesian air accident investigator Nurcahyo Utomo told reporters at a news conference. "If one of the nine hadn't occurred, maybe the accident wouldn't have occurred." (www.bbc.com) Más...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
Has everybody read what Capt. Sully has said about this in the New York Times magazine? He blames lack of training and lack of manufacturer and FAA proper supervision for the development of the whole device and calls it a "death trap" which should lead to a better system.
Capt. Sully also noted Airbus has an inherent design flaw, that being the 2 side sticks are not connected. So one pilot cannot look at his stick and visually tell what kind of stick inputs the other pilot is making. Having said that, it's still hard to believe Boeing made the decisions it did regarding MCAS and AOA. Particularly, the note of 'optional safety equipment' meaning a second AOA sensor. There is no such things as 'Optional' when safety is concerned. Geez
LINK TO REPORT IN FULL
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http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/2018%20-%20035%20-%20PK-LQP%20Final%20Report.pdf
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http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/2018%20-%20035%20-%20PK-LQP%20Final%20Report.pdf
FROM REPORT: THIS SAYS IT ALL
The installed left AOA sensor had a 21° bias which was undetected during the installation test in Denpasar. The erroneous AOA resulted in different indications during the flight from Denpasar to Jakarta, including IAS (indicated airspeed) DISAGREE, ALT (altitude) DISAGREE, FEEL DIFF PRESS (feel differential pressure) light, activations of Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) and left control column stick shaker which were active throughout the flight. The flight crew was able to stop the repetitive MCAS activation by switched the stabilizer trim to cut out.
After landed in Jakarta, the flight crew reported some malfunctions, but did not include the activation of stick shaker and STAB TRIM to CUT OUT. The AOA DISAGREE alert was not available on the aircraft therefore, the flight crew did not report it. The reported problem would only be able to rectify by performing tasks of AOA Disagree.
The installed left AOA sensor had a 21° bias which was undetected during the installation test in Denpasar. The erroneous AOA resulted in different indications during the flight from Denpasar to Jakarta, including IAS (indicated airspeed) DISAGREE, ALT (altitude) DISAGREE, FEEL DIFF PRESS (feel differential pressure) light, activations of Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) and left control column stick shaker which were active throughout the flight. The flight crew was able to stop the repetitive MCAS activation by switched the stabilizer trim to cut out.
After landed in Jakarta, the flight crew reported some malfunctions, but did not include the activation of stick shaker and STAB TRIM to CUT OUT. The AOA DISAGREE alert was not available on the aircraft therefore, the flight crew did not report it. The reported problem would only be able to rectify by performing tasks of AOA Disagree.
Yeah, I read that. The pilots of that flight should be drawn and quartered for not even mentioning the uncommanded stabilizer movements.
Sad to see that even now, after all the information out about the 737 Max, a lot of confusion appears in the comments on this page. Proves to me that this plane should not fly again until all is cristal clear about it's design faults and how they are compensated for by systems and the crew. Again Boeing is still uncooperative to cover their you know what.