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NTSB Public Docket Reveals Crew Confusion, Training Discrepancies in Atlas Air 3591 Downing
Although the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has not yet issued its probable cause determination in the Feb. 23, 2019 downing of an Atlas Air Boeing 767 freighter near Houston, Texas, information contained in the Board's recently-released public docket on the investigation paints a picture of a confused flight crew working against one another trying to keep their aircraft in the sky. (www.ainonline.com) Más...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
so with these speculations flying all around the place, why has the FAA not yet swooped down to do an inspection of the qualifications of all the pilots of Atlas Air? Unqualified airmen in commercial cockpits is an item on the curiosity list of the FAA, or at least ought to be. A couple of inspectors for a day or so, then some answers to direct questions, and this is put to rest. Perhaps...
As someone who has hired hundreds of people over the years, you call every former employer for the last 15 years, verify the start and end dates of employment, and ask if the person is eligible for re-hire. Some won't answer the last question, but some will tell you something like, "applicant is eligible for rehire if passes the xyz exam". If there are gaps of more than 30 days between jobs, you require the applicant to provide more detail about the gap. If the answers are not forthcoming, pass. Better no pilot than one with a sketchy history.
For those stating that this is an old article, as seen, some here, such as myself, have not seen it previously.
That there is not a digital database that employers could file the names of pilots who do not pass check rides or have other performance issues and are let go for such reasons, is borderline insanity. This should be something that the FAA needs to institute so aviation companies can look up said applicant's records before putting them in either seat.
That there is not a digital database that employers could file the names of pilots who do not pass check rides or have other performance issues and are let go for such reasons, is borderline insanity. This should be something that the FAA needs to institute so aviation companies can look up said applicant's records before putting them in either seat.
Just in regard to the (elevator) control surfaces moving in opposite directions, this is true for aircraft certified to the later requirements (maybe post approximately the late 1970's). The theory being to guard against jammed controls. It was not the case in the Fokker F28 for example, certified circa 1968, but would be true for the F100 circa 1987.
I believe that the investigation has found that the T/O-G/A button was accidently pushed by the captain when moving the flap handle. As for question 3, yes, they were already in too steep a dive to regain level flight in the remaining altitude. This situation is frequently termed having the "nose buried." As for the split input, I have no idea about thee 767.
If that was the case why didn’t the crew follow the flight director cues?
Thanks for the clarification.