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Global Regulators Aren’t Aligned in Boeing 737 Max Recertification
Global aviation regulators have yet to formulate a unified approach to getting the grounded Boeing Co. 737 Max airliner back into service after two fatal crashes, a division that risks undermining public trust in the industry’s safety record, according to Alexandre de Juniac, the head of the IATA association of global airlines. “The point on which we have to pay attention is for the regulators to be aligned,” de Juniac said in an interview with Bloomberg TV in Berlin. “Otherwise the… (skift.com) Más...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/canada-official-737max-software-working-level-view-1.5370540
If the MAX had been submitted for certification without MCAS, but with, say, "additional pilot training required," would it have passed? If not, what would the remedy have been?
Simple answer is if the aircraft gets into a nose high stall condition, it cannot recover without the MCAS. This situation is unlikely to occur but it could happen.
What ???? Surely you don't believe that ! The pilot can still drive the stabalizer himself. One major issue that has to be fixed is that when the pilot overrides the MCAS position with the column switches, when he releases the up or down manual electrical witches, the system goes back to MCAS control. Since the MCAS caused the runaway actions of the stab trim, why are they giving control back to the malfunctioning system ? If the pilot overrides MCAS, MCAS should be disengaged period ! If the pilot wants it back, (why would he) he can turn it back on himself.
There is something wrong with a design that requires the pilot to use trim to recover from a critical situation like a stall. Even then MCAS moves the stabilizer much faster than the pilot trim switches can, and will win in the end as it did in the second crash.
It’s unproven that it would require trim to recover in such situations, unless you can offer some reference for that.
Them why is MCAS in this airplane ?
To keep stick forces up to the point of stall as required for certification. Also to make it fly like an NG.
Only works in level flight, try it in nose high attitude then try to recover without MCAS
It seems that you reveal less with your avatar/bio. than you seem intent to reveal in your posts. If your working knowledge is the result of employment as a current 737 MAX pilot or sim. instructor, you may reveal the fact with the same anonymity as h135 has revealed an obvious and oft down voted understanding of the original, or published intent of MCAS. I personally believe the MCAS system was sullied by lead engineer/code writer changes during the development process, and the lack of a comparator reference for dual AOA input as a design fundamental, as an egregious error on the design/certification teams part. Among others. The ATP who has inadverently stalled a transport category jet and has no need for pitch trim corrections in the recovery process has yet to be invented.
And, by the by, throttles 94% at impact, twice. An unheralded unforced error no doubt covered in the QRH stab trim runaway procedures. RED BOX items.
And, by the by, throttles 94% at impact, twice. An unheralded unforced error no doubt covered in the QRH stab trim runaway procedures. RED BOX items.
Yes with the control column at full rear position, anyway enough. By the way the beginning of this discussion is about if the max could be certified without MCAS !
Well aware of that and Yes it could have been but not grandfathered on the original type certificate, thus a new type rating, and the source of the whole kerfuffle. I get it and am equally done!