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United CEO Declines Need for Additional Boeing 737 MAX Training
During a conference on Wednesday to discuss new international routes out of San Francisco, the CEO of United Airlines made his first public comments on the safety of the 737 MAX. His comments came over a month after Lion Air Flight 610 crashed into the Java Sea on Oct. 29, 2018. (airlinegeeks.com) Más...
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Very good point, Bill.
And yes - the 737 NG/MAX all have AOA display “available” in the options list. AA and DL did buy it but UA and SW did not. I would guess that a Boeing did not charge SW much to turn on the PFD display of AOA!
And yes - the 737 NG/MAX all have AOA display “available” in the options list. AA and DL did buy it but UA and SW did not. I would guess that a Boeing did not charge SW much to turn on the PFD display of AOA!
Well the prevailing theory at this point seems to be that the AOA sensor wasn’t working properly on the Lion Air flight. So what good would an AOA indicator do if the information is wrong to begin with?
At the least you get to see what the automation is reacting to. As long as airplanes are allowed to challenge pilots for control, they should be looking at the same information.
Weston, Imagine this scenario:
A pilot has been trained that a stall-protection feature exists that will activate Nose Down trim when the Captain's AOA vane senses near-stall conditions. Later, in flight, the pilot sees the trim running spurts of Nose Down adjustment. The pilot knows from the thrust setting and deck angle (Especially in visual conditions) that the airplane is not in danger of a stall, but he can see the AOA indicator showing its false reading. It then becomes immediately obvious what the problem is - and the solution. In the current reality, the pilot can only *guess* at what might have gone wrong and may well be overloaded with multiple warning noises and lights due to the erroneous AOA. Does it seem that an AOA indicator might have some value?
A pilot has been trained that a stall-protection feature exists that will activate Nose Down trim when the Captain's AOA vane senses near-stall conditions. Later, in flight, the pilot sees the trim running spurts of Nose Down adjustment. The pilot knows from the thrust setting and deck angle (Especially in visual conditions) that the airplane is not in danger of a stall, but he can see the AOA indicator showing its false reading. It then becomes immediately obvious what the problem is - and the solution. In the current reality, the pilot can only *guess* at what might have gone wrong and may well be overloaded with multiple warning noises and lights due to the erroneous AOA. Does it seem that an AOA indicator might have some value?
I agree with Bill in having an actual visual indicator. Since prevailing theory is the AOA sensor wasn't acting properly, the computer should have been programmed to indicate as such, using data obtained from other sensors. It should also have not initiated the so called back up system, in this case the MCAS, and let the pilots do their job. It did not have all the relevant info it should have had. I am not defending Lion Air's mechanical foul ups and the fact this craft should not have been allowed return to flight until fully tested. But what happens in flight should this happen to another MAX. Instead of having to wrestle control away from the computer, it should indicate a suspicious fault to the pilots, and let them fly the craft.
"Southwest Airlines is making changes to its aircraft as a result of the accident as well. The airline is adding an AOA indicator on all its MAX aircraft. American Airlines also uses AOA indicators, an optional display for Boeing 737 customers, on its 737 Next Generation and MAX airplanes."
Are you kidding me? In this day and age, how can any fixed wing aircraft not come standard with AOA indication when multiple sensors are on the aircraft already measuring it? Making it optional is the first crime and not taking the option compounds it.