This Natilus autonomous aircraft has a long way to go before it’s certified and operational. Insurance costs - liability, hull loss, loss of cargo - are likely to start off very high, without any operational experience to quantify risk. I’m not holding my breath waiting for this aircraft concept to succeed. You can read the manufacturer’s marketing claims here: https://natilus.co/

(Written on 01/29/2023)(Permalink)

This Natilus autonomous aircraft has a long way to go before it’s certified and operational. Insurance costs - liability, hull loss, loss of cargo - are likely to start off very high, without any operational experience to quantify risk. I’m not holding my breath waiting for this aircraft concept to succeed.

(Written on 01/29/2023)(Permalink)

Pairing such an inexperienced captain with an experienced high-time first officer would be prudent, as would having a check pilot in the jump seat, for the new captain’s first few trips. Perhaps Delta does this?

(Written on 01/27/2023)(Permalink)

This article does a deeper dive into the legal niceties: https://christinenegroni.com/judge-reopens-criminal-case-against-boeing-in-737-max-crashes/

(Written on 01/21/2023)(Permalink)

Last two sentences of the squawked article: “This comes two days after a very close call at the same airport when a Delta 737 on the takeoff roll almost collided with an American Airlines Boeing 777 crossing the active runway. Concerns are rightly being raised regarding the occurrence of two potentially dangerous incidents occurring within the same week at such a major airport.” Seriously? A low speed fender-bender during pushback is not at all comparable with a potential high-speed collision on an active runway.

(Written on 01/18/2023)(Permalink)

May 24, 1988 TACA International flight 110 Belize City to New Orleans, 737-300. Double flameout, landed on a grass-covered levee. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TACA_Flight_110

(Written on 01/16/2023)(Permalink)

“They ended the production run of the 717, which airlines vastly preferred to the 737-700.” Looking at the orders booked for both types shows the opposite, that airlines preferred the 737-700. “….the catastrophic decision to end 757 production.” Catastrophic?? 757 orders slowed to a trickle after 2001, so it made business sense to end production when no one wanted any more. “…I’m not sure that Boeing is doing badly in waiting for clean-sheet designs…” Agreed. As boughbw writes, better to wait “for the next technology advances, presumably in engines.”, meaning significantly better fuel efficiency than presently available engines offer. Trouble is, no one wants to take the first step: airframers want to wait until next-generation engines are available, engine manufacturers want assurances that there’s an airplane to justify the considerable investment needed to develop new engines.

(Written on 01/06/2023)(Permalink)

The squawked article portrays an A220-500 as a threat to the 737-8 MAX. The 737-8 is certified and in production; the A220-500 is a concept, yet to be developed, tested, certified. 737 monthly production rate of 31 is planned to increase to 47 by end of 2023. A220 monthly rate is planned to increase to all of 14 in 2025. Even if the A220-500 looks to be a better airplane, it’s not “poised to corner Boeing”, as it is many years away from being a substantial market threat to the 737-8.

(Written on 01/04/2023)(Permalink)

What is a “centralized U.S. operation”? How and why would it make Southwest uniquely vulnerable to this cascade of cancellation chaos?

(Written on 12/27/2022)(Permalink)

This crash occurred 21 October 2022. Another report here: https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/300080

(Written on 12/26/2022)(Permalink)