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VIDEO: Runway Incursion: Near-Disaster at Springfield Branson National Airport
On Wednesday June 27, 2018, about 12:51 central daylight time, a runway incursion occurred at Springfield-Branson National Airport, Springfield, Missouri when an airport operations vehicle ("VAN 7") crossed runway 14 while an Embraer 145, operated by Envoy Air as flight ENY 3660, was on its takeoff roll with 57 passengers aboard. This video reveals the circumstances surrounding the incursion, and the audio (courtesy of LiveATC.net) appears to unambiguously pin this incident squarely on… (www.youtube.com) Más...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
EMB145 holds 50 pax not 57.
Old RECOR being down voted again for unnecessary comments. -27 so far! Well done....
The van driver's report says the (only) van radio was locked on the "Ground Tower" (sic) frequency. Presumably this is 121.9 at KSGF. If so the van driver has no idea what is happening on the rest of the airport coms, most importantly Tower 119.9 if Tower 119.9 are giving the actual aircraft Take Off (and Landing) clearances.
Hypothetically if there were two (or more) Controllers on duty, one Controller could be operating on Ground (121.9) and maybe Clearance Delivery (123.675), while another (different) Controller could be on Tower (119.9). If there were only two com boxes on the Junglejet then they might have been working with one, toggling from 121.9 to a preset 119.9, and using the other to monitor Unicom (122.95).
Presumably (hypothetically) Ground 121.9 would clear Envoy 3660 to "Taxi into position and Hold, Contact Tower 119.9". At this point Ground can forget about Envoy and (if Envoy is only using one box for coms) Envoy toggles to Tower 119.9 and announces he is "In position ready to roll on 14" but, crucially, neither Envoy nor Tower 119.9 can hear Ground 121.9 when he clears Van 7 to cross 14. Meanwhile Tower 119.9 (not aware of Van 7's clearance to cross 14 on 121.9) can tell Envoy 3660 that he is "Cleared to Take Off" on 14.
Understand all of this is purely speculation. But if it is correct, maybe Van 7 at KSGF, and maybe all Ground equipment which might cross a Runway, needs to be equipped with a radio permanently set to whichever frequency is used to give Clearances to aircraft which use the Runways (in addition to Ground controlling the Taxiways).
Hypothetically if there were two (or more) Controllers on duty, one Controller could be operating on Ground (121.9) and maybe Clearance Delivery (123.675), while another (different) Controller could be on Tower (119.9). If there were only two com boxes on the Junglejet then they might have been working with one, toggling from 121.9 to a preset 119.9, and using the other to monitor Unicom (122.95).
Presumably (hypothetically) Ground 121.9 would clear Envoy 3660 to "Taxi into position and Hold, Contact Tower 119.9". At this point Ground can forget about Envoy and (if Envoy is only using one box for coms) Envoy toggles to Tower 119.9 and announces he is "In position ready to roll on 14" but, crucially, neither Envoy nor Tower 119.9 can hear Ground 121.9 when he clears Van 7 to cross 14. Meanwhile Tower 119.9 (not aware of Van 7's clearance to cross 14 on 121.9) can tell Envoy 3660 that he is "Cleared to Take Off" on 14.
Understand all of this is purely speculation. But if it is correct, maybe Van 7 at KSGF, and maybe all Ground equipment which might cross a Runway, needs to be equipped with a radio permanently set to whichever frequency is used to give Clearances to aircraft which use the Runways (in addition to Ground controlling the Taxiways).
The Ground controller has to co-ordinate the crossing of a runway with the Tower controller. This is done internally up in the tower cab, and should be accomplished on a recorded intercom line. So, there should be a complete recording of the incident, including the radio communications and the internal tower co-ordination. (I guess it is possible the co-ordination isn't recorded at this airport, but I would be surprised.)
(There could also have been a "cab coordinator" or a "tower assist" position in the control tower "helping" the tower controller who could have also been in the mix, but even this co-ordinator would have to get permission from the "tower" controller.)
As another comment pointed out, the ground controller does not put an aircraft into position on a runway. Nor can they cross a runway without the tower controller's permission.
Just like any incident or accident, there is a whole "chain" of events that caused this issue.
(There could also have been a "cab coordinator" or a "tower assist" position in the control tower "helping" the tower controller who could have also been in the mix, but even this co-ordinator would have to get permission from the "tower" controller.)
As another comment pointed out, the ground controller does not put an aircraft into position on a runway. Nor can they cross a runway without the tower controller's permission.
Just like any incident or accident, there is a whole "chain" of events that caused this issue.
Thanks for taking the time to give a detailed explanation. It was pure speculation on my part to try to understand what might have happened. It is reassuring to know that SOP should prevent this type of incident. And it is gratifying that you took the time to explain. Thanks again.
Ground would not clear and airplane to “line up and wait” the tower controller would be the only one to do that.
OK Thanks for clarifying. Been a while since I was on a "Controlled" field.