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Pilots Disabled Critical Computers Moments Before AirAsia Crash
The pilots of AirAsia Bhd. Flight 8501 cut power to a critical computer system that normally prevents planes from going out of control shortly before it plunged into the Java Sea, two people with knowledge of the investigation said. The action appears to have helped trigger the events of Dec. 28, when the Airbus Group NV A320 climbed so abruptly that it lost lift and it began falling with warnings blaring in the cockpit, the people said. All 162 aboard were killed. The pilots had been… (www.bloomberg.com) Más...Sort type: [Top] [Newest]
Having flown numerous international flight operations in wide body aircraft, into areas of severe, even extreme tropical weather that had developed after departure, trying to avoid the storm by extending our route to circumnavigate the area was our best and safest option, often times that option was not practicable, leaving the only alternative to try to "top" the storm, and climb to a clear altitude, which statistically, was highly improbable. Some storms had tops near 70,000 feet, 45 to 50,000 feet being average. Attempting this action was fraught with danger. As most experienced pilots are aware, severe thunderstorms have extreme conditions of rapid vertical movement of columns of atmosphere, both ascending and descending at prodigious rates at times exceeding ten thousand feet a minute, and far greater on occasion, Had this crew attempted to out climb the approaching storm, they could have encountered these conditions, especially if they were climbing within the last several thousand feet before climbing clear above and historically much violence and severe conditions could be in the final two to four thousand feet before climbing clear, and still in a very serious situation until well clear of the storm.Some reports indicate the crew had established an extreme rate of climb, far exceeding the capabilities of the aircraft parameters, it would appear the crew entered into an area of this extreme weather that they were unable to cope with and in some last desperate attempt to get to a safe altitude either pushed or were pushed to the limits of operation for the aircraft, far exceeding design limits, both operational and structural causing the aircraft to enter a regime of flight outside the envelope of normal operations and suffered catastrophic lost of control that resulted in a uncontrollable and fatal crash of the aircraft. Intentionally or unintentionally disconnecting vital aircraft control systems, contributed to the disaster, especially if intentional. It would indicate a desperate attempt by the crew to try everything before giving up control. Most crews "fly" the aircraft until structural failure or impact
this is deceptive writing, done by someone with zero instrument stick time, wrongly suggesting that pilots need autopilots in operation to be able to control flight. I have disengaged autopilot on occasion when weather conditions were severe, and that is what happened here. I have flown light aircraft without autopilot where I had to use continuous inputs to keep the gages in good behavior. Big aircraft can also be flown this way from time to time. I disengage when the weather gets crappy and look for a way out of the situation, if one presents itself. Otherwise, buckle down and ride. Needle/ball is the way to fly .
WTF happened to Pilots flying airplanes instead of computers.
RVSM is the biggest reason... 1000' vertical separation.
Automation and fuel efficiency among others
Airbus has an OEB (Operation Engineering Bulletin) that says turn off 2 of the 3 ADIRS in order to get the plane into Alternate Law. And you do it via the ADIRS to allow the flight computers (FAC, ELAC, SEC) to continue to provide information to each other and to the logic of Alternate Law. Because Alternate Law still provides high and low speed stability, yaw damping and load factor limitations. But when you turn off the computer that is calculating and providing that data you completely lose that information, so it's kind of like a double failure when it only needs to be a single failure.
Disclaimer: I hope based on the information the pilots had they chose the best course of action at that time.
The Airbus ECAM will lead you down the wrong path very quickly, and only if you remember the OEB will it get done.
Disclaimer: I hope based on the information the pilots had they chose the best course of action at that time.
The Airbus ECAM will lead you down the wrong path very quickly, and only if you remember the OEB will it get done.