Date: | Friday 21 November 2014 |
Time: | 10:10 |
Type: | Embraer EMB-500 Phenom 100 |
Owner/operator: | JetSuite |
Registration: | N584JS |
MSN: | 50000140 |
Year of manufacture: | 2010 |
Total airframe hrs: | 3854 hours |
Engine model: | Pratt & Whitney Canada PW617F-E |
Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2 |
Aircraft damage: | Substantial, written off |
Category: | Accident |
Location: | Houston-Sugar Land Regional Airport, TX (SGR) -
United States of America
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Phase: | Landing |
Nature: | Ferry/positioning |
Departure airport: | Houston-William P. Hobby Airport, TX (HOU/KHOU) |
Destination airport: | Houston-Sugar Land Regional Airport, TX (SGR/KSGR) |
Investigating agency: | NTSB |
Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:An Embraer EMB-500 Phenom 100 corporate jet suffered a runway excursion accident after landing at Houston-Sugar Land Regional Airport, TX (SGR).
The airplane operated on a repositioning flight from Houston-William P. Hobby Airport, TX (HOU) to Sugar Land Airport.
Following an ILS approach, the Sugar Land tower controller cleared the flight to land on runway 35. The airplane reached 50 ft above touchdown zone elevation (TDZE) at an indicated airspeed of 118 knots (KIAS). The airplane crossed the runway displaced threshold about 112 KIAS, and it touched down on the runway at 104 KIAS with about a 7-knot tailwind.
About 1.6 seconds after touchdown of the main landing gear, the nose landing gear touched down and the pilot's brake pedal input increased, with intermediate oscillations, over a period of 7.5 seconds before reaching full pedal deflection. During this time, the airplane achieved its maximum wheel braking friction coefficient and deceleration. The cockpit voice recorder recorded both pilots express concern the that the airplane was not slowing. About 4 seconds after the airplane reached maximum deceleration, the pilot applied the emergency parking brake (EPB). Upon application of the EPB, the wheel speed dropped to zero and the airplane began to skid, which resulted in reverted-rubber hydroplaning, further decreasing the airplane's stopping performance.
The airplane continued past the end of the runway, crossed a service road, and came to rest in a drainage ditch. Postaccident examination of the brake system and data downloaded from the brake control unit indicated that it functioned as commanded during the landing. The airplane was not equipped with thrust reversers or spoilers to aid in deceleration.
The operator's standard operating procedures required pilots to conduct a go-around if the airspeed at 50 ft above TDZE exceeded 111 kts. Further, the landing distances published in the airplane flight manual (AFM) are based on the airplane slowing to its reference speed (Vref) of 101 KIAS at 50 ft over the runway threshold. The airplane's speed at that time exceeded Vref, which resulted in an increased runway distance required to stop; however, landing distance calculations performed in accordance with the AFM showed that the airplane should still have been able to stop on the available runway. An airplane performance study also showed that the airplane had adequate distance available on which to stop had the pilot continued to apply maximum braking rather than engage the EPB. The application of the EPB resulted in skidding, which increased the stopping distance.
Although the runway was not contaminated with standing water at the time of the accident, the performance study revealed that the maximum wheel braking friction coefficient was significantly less than the values derived from the unfactored wet runway landing distances published in the AFM, and was more consistent with the AFM-provided landing distances for runways contaminated with standing water.
It is likely that, based on the landing data in the AFM, the crew expected a faster rate of deceleration upon application of maximum braking; when that rate of deceleration was not achieved, the pilot chose to engage the EPB, which only further degraded the airplane's braking performance.
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The pilot's engagement of the emergency parking brake during the landing roll, which decreased the airplane's braking performance and prevented it from stopping on the available runway. Contributing to the pilot's decision to engage the emergency parking brake was the expectation of a faster rate of deceleration and considerably shorter wet runway landing distance provided by the airplane flight manual than that experienced by the crew upon touchdown and an actual wet runway friction level lower than the assumed runway fiction level used in the calculation of the stopping distances published in the airplane flight manual."
METAR:
16:03 UTC / 10:03 local time:
KSGR 211603Z 12009KT RA 2SM BR SCT008 BKN035 OVC044 19/18 A3015 RMK AO2 P0002 T01890178
16:12 UTC / 10:12 local time:
KSGR 211612Z 13008KT 6SM -RA BR FEW008 19/18 A3015 RMK BKN033 OVC042 AO2 P0003 T01890178
Wind 130 degrees at 8 knots; Visibility: 6 miles; light rain, mist; few clouds at 800 feet AGL; broken clouds at 3300 feet AGL; overcast cloud deck at 4200 feet AGL; Temperature: 19°C; Dewpoint: 18°C; Pressure 1021.1 mb
16:25 UTC / 10:25 local time:
KSGR 211625Z 13008KT 10SM FEW006 BKN018 A3015 RMK AO2 OVC044 19/18 RAE20 ACRFT MISHAP P0003 T01940178
16:53 UTC / 10:53 local time:
KSGR 211653Z 13009KT 10SM FEW007 FEW011 A3015 RMK AO2 OVC017 20/18 RAE20 SLP212 ACRFT MISHAP P0003 T02000183
Accident investigation:
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| |
Investigating agency: | NTSB |
Report number: | CEN15LA057 |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 2 years and 11 months |
Download report: | Final report |
|
Sources:
KPRC Houston NTSB
Location
Images:
photo (c) Alan Wilson; Tucson International Airport, AZ (TUS/KTUS); 09 February 2014; (CC:by-sa)
Revision history:
Date/time | Contributor | Updates |